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Abstract
We propose a new analysis of ability modals. After briefly criticizing extant approaches,
we turn our attention to the venerable but vexed conditional analysis of ability ascriptions.
We give an account that builds on the conditional analysis, but avoids its weaknesses by
incorporating a layer of quantification over a contextually supplied set of actions.
1 Introduction
Our topic is ability modals, modals of the kind found in the following sentences:
(1) John can go swimming this evening.
(2) Mary cannot eat another bite of this rotten meal.
(3) Louise is able to pick Roger up from work today.
As a simple heuristic, we can identify ability modals as modals that appear in sentences that
can be paraphrased pS is able to 'q (on its most prominent reading) or pS has the ability/power
to 'q (or with their negations).1
Our topic in particular is ability modals which have a specific action—an action tagged with
a specific time—as the modal’s prejacent, as in (1), (2), and (3). Other ability modals, as in
(4) Susie can swim.
(5) Jim is able to touch his nose with the tip of his tongue.
have as their prejacent a generic action, one not tied to a specific time. We assume that ability
ascriptions with generic actions are just specific ability ascriptions embedded under a generic
operator, and thus that a semantics for generic ability ascriptions will fall out of our proposal
together with a suitable semantics for the generic operator.
We will survey three extant accounts of ability modals—the orthodox account, the universal
account, and the conditional account—and argue that none is satisfactory. We then propose a
new account that builds on the insights of the conditional account but avoids its well-known
problems.
⇤The authors would like to thank audiences at MIT and at the Semantics and Philosophy in Europe Eighth
Colloquium at the University of Cambridge, three anonymous reviewers for the Amsterdam Colloquium, Alex
Byrne, Kai von Fintel, Martin Hackl, Samia Hesni, Sabine Iatridou, Matthias Jenny, Justin Khoo, Milo Phillips-
Brown, Kieran Setiya, Bradford Skow, Robert Stalnaker, Stephen Yablo, and each other for valuable discussion
and feedback. We thank Matthias Jenny for the inspired title; unfortunately we have not been able to discover
anything noteworthy about the interaction between attitude predicates and ability modals.
1Unless otherwise noted, all uses of ‘can’ and ‘is able to’ in examples and definitions that follow are to be
read so that they can be paraphrased this way, and are to be treated as interchangeable.
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2 The Orthodox Account
Kratzer (1977, 1981) gives a unified account of natural language modals according to which
‘can’ is an existential quantifier whose domain is the set of worlds that are ‘best’ according to a
contextually supplied modal base h and ordering source g, both functions from worlds to sets of
propositions. Given a world w, these together determine a preorder  g,w on
T
h(w) as follows:
u  g,w v i↵ { 2 g(w) : v 2  } ✓ { 2 g(w) : u 2  }. Letting besth,g,w be the set of worlds
in
T
h(w) that are minimal according to  g,w, we have:
(6) Orthodox Account: JS can 'Kh,g,w = 1 i↵ 9w0 2 besth,g,w : J'Kh,g,w0 = 1.
This account of modals is widely enough accepted that it has fair claim to being orthodoxy. But
it’s hard to see how to implement it for ability modals. The problem is that there is no natural
value for the ordering source to take that makes the right predictions about ability modals.
On the standard implementation, the modal base is circumstantial, and the ordering source
takes each world to a set of propositions that ‘holds fixed certain intrinsic features of the agent
in question’ at that world.2 But this approach makes predictions that are much too weak.
Suppose Jim and Jo are at a crucial stage in a game of darts. Jo’s young child Susie exclaims
(7) Let me play! I can hit the bullseye on this throw.
But Susie can hardly ever hit the dartboard, and she has never even gotten a dart to stick in
the dartboard; she can’t, isn’t able to, doesn’t have the ability to, hit a bullseye on this throw.
(To fix intuitions, imagine that Susie does go for the shot, and that the dart falls far short of
the dartboard.) In light of these facts about Susie, (7) is clearly false on its abilitative reading.
But on the approach just sketched, (7) is predicted to be true, since it is compatible with Susie’s
intrinsic properties, and local circumstances, that she hit a bullseye. (Note that (7) does have
a true reading which can be paraphrased as
(8) It can happen that I hit the bullseye on this throw.
This is a circumstantial/metaphysical reading of ‘can’. The standard proposal thus adequately
accounts for this reading, but not for the prominent abilitative reading of (7), paraphrasable
not as (8) but as
(9) I’m able to hit the bullseye on this throw.)
A natural first reaction to this issue is to include in the value of the ordering source at
w propositions which describe what is normal at w. It’s not obvious this helps even in this
case: hitting the bullseye is unlikely but not obviously abnormal. But even granting that it
is abnormal in a relevant sense for Susie to hit the bullseye, this proposal makes the wrong
predictions in other cases: someone can be able to do something even if doing it is highly
abnormal. For example, Susie is a competent speaker of English, and thus is able to utter the
sentence
(10) Every art, inquiry, action, and pursuit is thought to aim at some good.
But, being a small child and non-philosopher, she only utters this sentence in circumstances
that are, intuitively, at least as abnormal as ones in which she hits the bullseye. The present
2Vetter (2013, p. 7); see Portner (2009). The following criticism also applies if abilities are in the ordering
source.
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proposal would thus wrongly predict that (11) is false:3
(11) Susie can utter (10) now.
Incorporating normality into the ordering source thus will help only if we can spell out a notion
of normality that treats Susie’s hitting a bullseye as abnormal, but Susie’s uttering (10) as
normal. We don’t see a natural way to do this, and thus we don’t see a natural way for the
orthodox semantics to account for ability modals (which isn’t to say there is no way for the
orthodox approach to account for ability modals; see Section 6).4
3 The Universal Account and the Dual
In response to worries like these, some have argued that abilitative ‘can’ has universal, rather
than existential, force.5 We do not think such an account could work.
To show this, we need to take a brief excursus to discuss the dual of ‘can’. Some have claimed
that abilitative ‘can’ has no dual.6 We find this puzzling. As with any other modal operator, we
can form the dual of ‘can’ simply by putting a negation above and below it. Intuitions suggest
that both ‘cannot but’ and ‘cannot not ’ (italics indicating stress), as in
(12) Ginger cannot but eat another cookie right now.
are natural language realizations of this semantic pattern, and thus are both duals of ‘can’.7
‘Must’ and ‘have to’ can also have the meaning of the dual of ‘can’, as in
(13) I have to sneeze. (Kratzer, 1977)
Why have these data generally been ignored in accounts of ability modals? We believe an
infelicity of nomenclature has promoted confusion here. ‘Cannot but’ is not an ability modal;
rather, it expresses compulsion of some kind, whereas ability has to do not with compulsion
but with potentiality. But this does not show that ‘cannot but’ is not the dual of ‘can’: it
simply illustrates the humdrum point that duals do not have the same meaning as each other,
even though they may have the same subject matter. Compare the situation with deontic
‘may’, which is a permission modal. Its dual does not express permission but rather (deontic)
compulsion. But it does not follow that deontic ‘may’ lacks a dual; rather, ‘may’ and ‘must’
are simply part of a larger unified class, namely that of deontic modals.
Likewise, ‘can’ and its dual do not both express something about ability, but they nonetheless
belong to a larger unified class, which we propose to call the class of practical modals.8 Carefully
delimiting this class is important for the study both of natural language and of traditional
philosophical problems. For instance, we suspect that the modals that appear in anankastic
constructions are best analyzed as practical modals, as are the modals often adverted to in
3Portner (2009)’s suggestion to make ‘can’ a good possibility modal runs into the same problem.
4Kenny (1976) gives a di↵erent critique of the orthodoxy, pointing out that on a modal analysis, pS can ('
or  )q ✏ pS can ' or S can  q. The account we’ll give inherits this objection. However, we are not persuaded
by it; we believe that a supervaluationist approach along the lines of Stalnaker (1981) can answer this criticism.
5E.g. Kenny (1976, p. 139), Brown (1988), Giannakidou (2001), Giannakidou and Staraki (2012).
6See Hackl (1998). Hackl correctly notes that it is harder than we might expect to hear an equivalence
between ‘can’ and, e.g. ‘not must not’. We are not sure what to make of this fact, but we don’t take it to show
that ability modals ‘lack a universal dual’ (Hackl, 1998, p. 10).
7Thanks to Stephen Yablo for pointing out the first of these.
8Following a suggestion of Kieran Setiya (p.c.).
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philosophical discussions of freedom of will and practical necessity.9
Once we have the dual of ‘can’ clearly in sight, it is hard to see how a universal analysis of
‘can’ could su ce. On such an analysis ‘cannot but’ would have existential force;10 this cannot
be squared with the intuition that ‘cannot but’ expresses compulsion of some sort.
4 The Conditional Analysis
Amore promising approach than the orthodox or universal accounts treats pS can 'q as meaning
the same as pS would ' if S tried to 'q.11 Let fc(w, ) be the selection function from Stalnaker
(1968)’s theory of conditionals: a contextually supplied function from a world w and proposition
 to the ‘closest’ world where  is true, and to w i↵ w 2  .12 Let ‘try(S,A)’ abbreviate JS
tries to do AKc. Then:
(14) Conditional Analysis: JS can 'Kc,w = 1 i↵ J'(S)Kc,fc(w,try(S,')) = 1.
' ranges over actions, which we will model as properties; J'(S)Kc is the proposition that '
holds of S, i.e., that S does '.
The conditional analysis (henceforth ‘CA’) gives much more intuitive truth-conditions than
the orthodox account, and avoids the problems sketched for the orthodox account: e.g., if Susie
tried to hit the bullseye, she wouldn’t; but if she tried to utter (10), she would. But the CA
has a number of problems of its own.
4.1 Monotonicity
First, the CA makes the wrong predictions about the monotonicity of ‘can’. Intuitions about
entailment suggest that ‘can’ is upward monotone:13
(15) John can swim the butterfly tonight.
seems to entail
(16) John can swim tonight.
Facts about NPI-licensing support this impression. ‘Cannot’ licenses NPIs, as in
(17) John can’t find any dance partners at this party.
According to a leading theory of NPI-licensing, the Fauconnier-Ladusaw analysis,14 NPIs are
licensed only in downward monotone environments; and ‘not can’ is downward monotone i↵
‘can’ is upward monotone.
The CA, however, predicts that ‘can’ is non-monotone, not upward monotone. Some will
take this to be a virtue; indeed, it’s not clear whether a sentence like
(18) I can ride a bike with training wheels right now.
9See e.g. von Fintel and Iatridou (2005), Aristotle (2002), Frankfurt (1969), Williams (1982), Setiya (2007).
10Surprisingly, Brown (1988) takes this prediction on board, claiming that the dual of ‘can’ is ‘might’.
11An old philosophical idea, traceable to Hume (1748), taken up by Moore (1912) a.o.; for formulations in a
model-theoretic framework, see especially Lehrer (1976), Cross (1986), and Thomason (2005). We use ‘try’ in
an inclusive sense which treats things like cars and elevators as the kinds of things that can try.
12Stalnaker’s uniqueness assumption is crucial for accounting for the negation and dual of ‘can’.
13M is upward monotone i↵ if ⇢ ✏  , thenM(⇢) ✏M( ); downward monotone i↵ if ⇢ ✏  , thenM( ) ✏M(⇢).
14See e.g. Ladusaw (1979), von Fintel (1999).
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entails
(19) I can ride a bike right now.
We suspect that data like this can be explained pragmatically, however. For note that someone
who can only ride a bike with training wheels could well insist
(20) I can ride a bike with training wheels now, so technically, I can ride a bike now.
This discussion is inadequate to the complexity of the issues at hand, but we think the data
suggest, pace the CA, that ‘can’ is upward monotone.
4.2 Dual
Second, the CA makes the wrong predictions about the dual of ‘can’:
(21) Dual (Conditional Analysis): JS cannot but 'Kc,w = 1 i↵ J'(S)Kc,fc(w,try(S,'¯)) = 1.
i.e. i↵ the closest world where S tries to not ' is one where S still '’s. This is too weak.
Intuitively pS cannot but 'q means not only that S '’s if she tries not to, but that she '’s no
matter what she tries to do. Another way to put the point is that the CA wrongly predicts that
pS cannot but not 'q and pS cannot but 'q are consistent.
4.3 Counterexamples
Finally, the CA faces a number of related counterexamples.
First, there are cases in which the CA predicts that pS can 'q is true when it’s false.15
Suppose that John is planning to go to a movie alone. He has no special commitment to go—he
has simply decided to. Ann asks John out to dinner; he replies:
(22) I’m sorry, I’m not able to go; I’m going to a movie.
There is a prominent reading on which (22) is true. But if John tried to have dinner with Ann,
he would succeed. So the CA cannot predict the true reading of (22). Importantly, ‘able to’
is abilitative on this reading, not deontic or bouletic: the retraction data associated with (22)
di↵er from the retraction data we would expect if it were a deontic or bouletic modal. When
someone makes a deontic or bouletic claim, rejoining with a claim about abilities feels like a
non-sequitur. But in the present case, pointing out that John really does have an ability to go
to dinner feels like a natural and e↵ective response (as in (30) below), not a non-sequitur.
Second, there are cases in which the CA predicts pS can 'q is false when it’s true.16 Suppose
Jones is a skilled golfer with an easy shot to make. Matt says:
(23) Jones is able make this shot right now.
Matt has intuitively said something true. Now suppose Jones takes the shot and misses. We
still judge Matt to have said something true. Afterwards, we can truly say
(24) Jones (was able to/had the ability to) make that shot at that time.17
15Chisholm (1964), Lehrer (1968), Thomason (2005). Cf. cases with a phobic or comatose agent.
16From Austin (1961).
17There is also a false reading of (24), brought out when ‘was able to’ has perfective aspect (see Bhatt (1999)
a.o.), but all that matters for our purposes is that there is a true reading, brought out when ‘was able to’ has
imperfective aspect. Thanks to Nilanjan Das and Raphae¨l Turcotte for data in Hindi, Bengali, and French.
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Yet given how fc is defined, the closest world where Jones tries to make the shot is the actual
world. Since Jones misses in the actual world, the CA thus wrongly predicts that (23) is false.
Another way to put this point is that
(25) Jones is able to make this shot right now, though if he tries of course he might miss.
is felicitous in some cases (as in this one), but is predicted by the CA to be always infelicitous.18
Finally, there are cases in which an agent can do something, but not if she tries to do it:19
(26) David can breathe normally for the next five minutes.
is true, but if David tried to breathe normally, he would end up breathing abnormally.
From a technical point of view, these cases are easy to respond to: simply change the
selection function relevant for ability ascriptions so that it selects worlds in a way that matches
our intuitions.20 The problem with this response is that it uncouples the CA from the analysis
of conditionals, and thus from our intuitions about conditionals and similarity in general.21
Without an intuitive characterization of the altered selection function, the resulting theory is
not particularly predictive or explanatory. We believe we can do better.
5 Our Proposal
Examples like those discussed in the last section have been taken by many to refute the CA.22
But we think that the CA is on the right track. It rightly captures the hypothetical nature
of abilities: whether you are able to perform a particular action depends in some way on
what happens under relevant alternate circumstances. Our account of ability modals aims to
preserve this insight, but avoid the problems discussed in the last section by adding a layer of
quantification over a contextually supplied set of actions to the meaning of ‘can’.
Let Ac,S be a set of actions that are—in a sense to be precisified—practically available to
an agent S in a context c. With fc the selection function as above, we propose:
(27) Our Proposal: JS can 'Kc,w = 1 i↵ 9A 2 Ac,S : J'(S)Kc,fc(w,try(S,A)) = 1.
I.e. pS can 'q is true just in case there is some contextually salient action A such that the
closest world where S tries to do A is a world where S does '.23
At a first pass, we may assume that in many cases, if an ability ascription has the form pS
can 'q, then Ac,S = {', '¯}. In those cases the predictions of our account come very close to
those of the CA. Thus, e.g., if we make this assumption in evaluating
(28) Louis can go for a swim in the MIT pool tonight.
18We can make the inverse point as well. Suppose that young Susie by chance hit a bullseye; there is a reading
on which ‘Susie was able to make the bullseye in this game’ remains false (a reading easiest to bring out with
imperfective morphology), contrary to the predictions of the CA.
19See Vranas (2010) for discussion.
20Thomason (2005) suggests a response along these lines in response to (22).
21It is a non-negotiable property of similarity that nothing is more similar to something than itself, a thesis
the altered selection function would have to abandon.
22See Austin (1961), Lehrer (1968), van Inwagen (1983).
23Chisholm (1964) makes a similar suggestion. As far as we know his suggestion hasn’t been taken up in the
subsequent literature, perhaps because he himself sketches a fairly serious objection to it; our account, however,
avoids that objection by restricting the set of actions we quantify over.
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then the action going for a swim in the MIT pool tonight is included in Ac,Louis; thus provided
that Louis can go swimming tonight if he tries to do so, we predict that (28) is true.
Ac,S won’t always be set this way, however. We argue that flexibility in how this parameter
is set by context crucially allows us to avoid the problems discussed in the last section: to avoid
the counterexamples and make plausible predictions about the dual and monotonicity of ‘can’.
5.1 Improved Predictions
The most important benefit of our view is that it avoids the counterexamples discussed in
Section 4.3. Consider first cases in which pS can 'q is intuitively false, even though it is true
that S would ' if S tried. Recall John, who says
(29) I’m not able to go [to dinner]; I’m going to a movie.
Unlike the CA, our account can predict that (29) has a prominent true reading. To be sure,
if John tried to go to dinner, he’d succeed. But, on our proposal, this does not guarantee the
truth of ‘John can go to dinner’ at a context c: the action meeting Ann for dinner (or something
much like it) must also be in Ac,John. That is, it must be treated as practically available to
John in a relevant sense in the context of utterance. If this condition is not met, then there is
no action in Ac,John such that trying to do it guarantees that John meets Ann for dinner, and
so (29) is true.
And indeed, we argue that this condition is not met in this case. An action may be treated
as unavailable in a context for a wide variety of reasons. In this case, the fact that the agent
has decided against the action su ces to rule it out. In other cases, an action may be treated
as unavailable because it takes place in the past relative to the time of evaluation; because
it violates certain rules that the agent in question is bound by; or because the agent is psy-
chologically or physiologically unable to even consider it (as if John were phobic or comatose).
Di↵erent notions of availability are at work in di↵erent contexts. Changes in the set Ac,S reflect
changes in the relevant notion of availability.
Circularity threatens here. Among other things, facts about S’s abilities might influence
the constituents of Ac,S . If we were aiming to give a reductive analysis of ability, we would
want to identify the constituents of Ac,S without reference to abilities. But, like most projects
of semantic analysis, our present aim is elucidation rather than reductive analysis (though we
don’t want to suggest that such a reductive analysis is impossible in the present framework).
One way to test the plausibility of our account is to see whether insisting on the availability
of the action meeting Ann for dinner can modulate intuitions in this case. Suppose Ann replies:
(30) Of course you can meet me—just skip the movie and come to dinner!
It seems that Ann has said something true: John can meet her for dinner. We hypothesize
that, in responding this way, Ann ensures that Ac,John include meeting Ann for dinner, and so
(30) comes out true.
Ac,S also plays a crucial role in responding to cases in which pS can 'q is intuitively true,
even though it is false that S would ' if S tried. Recall the golf case. We said that
(31) Jones can make this shot.
is intuitively true. How can we predict this? Suppose Jones aimed to the left of the pin; had
he aimed to the right, he would have made the shot. Let the action aiming to the right be in
Ac,Jones. Then we predict that ‘Jones can make this shot’ is true even though Jones actually
misses. This looks intuitive: indeed, we say of Jones
7
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(32) Well, he could have made the shot, if he had only aimed to the right.
This move can be applied quite broadly. We often ascribe abilities to agents even when they
are not certain to succeed at a given action should they try, and even in cases where they fail
when they in fact try.24
A worry about over-generation arises. Bob, a lousy chess player, is playing white in a chess
match against Kasparov. Let Ac,Bob include, for all possible sequences of moves for white in the
game, the action of taking that sequence of moves. One of these is such that, given Kasparov’s
course of play, if Bob completes that sequence of moves, he will beat Kasparov. It would seem
to follow that
(33) Bob can beat Kasparov in this match.
is true. But (33) is false (on its prominent reading).25 To predict this, we propose to place
certain default constraints on what goes into Ac,S—roughly, that an action is in Ac,S only if
the agent in question has the right kind of epistemic access to that action: perhaps, only if
she knows that that action is a way for her to do '. There is some sequence of moves that
would beat Kasparov. But Bob doesn’t know which sequence it is. This means that it is not
in Ac,Bob, which explains why we judge (33) false.26
Finally, appeal to Ac,S lets us explain why ‘David can breathe normally for the next five
minutes’, and sentences like it, are true: there is something relevant (let us suppose) such that
if David tries to do that, he breathes normally (say, working on a problem set).
The notion of practical availability that determines Ac,S is determined by context. As with
other quantificational structures in natural language, change the context, and you change the
domain of quantification, and thus the relevant notion of availability. Much more needs to
be said to flesh out a complete meta-semantic story about how Ac,S is determined, and the
plausibility of our view will turn on the ultimate success of such a project. But we take the
present discussion to show that whether or not pS is able to 'q is taken to be true in a context
c depends not just on what would happen if S tried to ', but also on which ways, if any, of
trying to ' are treated as practically available to S in c.
5.2 The Dual
Our approach makes good predictions about the meaning of the dual of ‘can’:
(34) Dual (Our Proposal): JS cannot but 'Kc,w=1 i↵ 8A 2 Ac,S :J'(S)Kc,fc(w,try(S,A))=1.
Informally: for every action A available to S in c, S does ' in the closest world in which S tries
to do A. In other words, no matter what S tries to do (among the actions we are treating as
practically available in c), S ends up doing '. Consider:
(35) Ginger cannot but eat another cookie right now.
(35) says that Ginger is compelled to eat another cookie: no matter what she tries to do, she’ll
end up eating another one. This is precisely what we predict. And unlike the CA, our account
of the dual rightly predicts that pS cannot but not 'q and pS cannot but 'q are inconsistent,
provided that Ac,S is non-empty, a condition that, plausibly, is satisfied in most cases.
24One might be tempted to adopt a graded proposal to accommodate this kind of case. We do not see a
fruitful way to spell out a view like that, though, and the present response seems satisfactory to us.
25Though making salient the sequence of moves in question can make prominent a true reading, as we predict.
26This also explains why flukey successes don’t always merit ability ascriptions; see Footnote 18.
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5.3 Monotonicity
Finally, ‘can’ is upward monotone on our account, matching intuitions and NPI-licensing.
6 Comparison and Conclusion
Our account is less of a departure from the orthodox Kratzerian approach to natural language
modality than the CA. In keeping with orthodoxy, we say that ‘can’ denotes an existential
quantifier. We depart from orthodoxy, however, in saying that ‘can’ quantifies over a set of
actions (i.e. properties), not a set of worlds. That said, a number of recent proposals have
departed from orthodoxy in a similar way, and converged on structurally similar accounts of
natural language modals. Our account of ability modals di↵ers from these because of the role
that the selection function plays in the view. But it shares with them a central structural
feature: quantification over sets of properties.27
It is too early to decide whether this approach will supplant orthodoxy, however, so it is also
worth asking whether our view can be reframed within the orthodox framework. The answer
is ‘yes’. For any agent S, just let the modal base take any world w to ? and let the ordering
source take any world w to {{w0} : 9A 2 Ac,S(w0 = fc(w, try(S,A))}. This account makes the
same predictions as ours.28 Should we adopt it?
We think not. If there were conclusive evidence in favor of the orthodox account for all
other modals, then it would make sense to formulate our view in its terms. But short of that,
we think there is no reason to go that way, because our approach fits far more naturally with a
meta-semantic story.29 A meta-semantics for both our view and its recasting in the orthodox
framework must account for how Ac,S and fc are determined, since both views refer to these
parameters. But the orthodox recasting of our account also makes reference to (what looks to
us like) a highly gerrymandered ordering source and an empty modal base. It is hard to see
how this ordering source could play any role in an explanatory meta-semantics. So we think
there is reason simply to dispense with it, as our account does.
We should also ask whether there are other elements of semantic machinery that can ‘see’
the di↵erences between the semantic entries and thus distinguish them on more straightforward
predictive grounds. We think there are; in particular, research into epistemic modals has
suggested that embedded epistemic modals quantify over their local contexts.30 Under this
assumption, the behavior of epistemic modals embedded under practical modals may help
decide between the two views under consideration.
The plausibility of our semantics will ultimately turn on this and a number of other open
questions. In addition to those highlighted above, these include the question of whether we
need to encode a non-accidental connection between S and ' in order for pS can 'q to come
out true; how to account for graded ability ascriptions like ‘Jones can easily make this shot’;
and how to account for actuality implications that arise from the interaction of ability modals
and aspect.
27See Yalcin (2012) and Willer (2013) on attitude verbs; Cariani et al. (2013) and Cariani (2013) on deontic
modals; and Villalta (2008) on verbs of desire. O cially the quantification in these proposals is over sets of
propositions, but this is a superficial modeling di↵erence—propositions are just zero-place properties.
28Modulo embedded epistemic modals; see below.
29This is the same kind of choice point that will decide the parallel question in other cases, as between, for
instance, the approach of Cariani et al. (2013) versus Kratzer’s approach.
30Veltman (1996), Stephenson (2007), Yalcin (2007), Klinedinst and Rothschild (2012), Stalnaker (2014) a.o.
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